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POLITICAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS 
OF POSSIBLE CLIMATIC CHANGES 
ROBERT D. MIEWALD 
Department of Political Science 
University of Nebraska-Lincoln 
Lincoln, Nebraska 68588 
There is something rather ludicrous about a learned 
paper on the political and social implications of the end of 
the world. Obviously, since we do not have much reliable 
historical information about this sort of event, the author can 
only offer some speculations which, however well-informed, 
are of debatable quality. And the reader, insofar as he or she 
actually believes in impending disaster, will doubtless be dis-
appointed by the absence of any specific recommendations 
about how to survive. Yet while this exercise may seem 
foolish, it is undertaken because of the conviction that it 
would be even more foolish for our society to continue as if 
drastic climatic change were an impossibility. 
Of course, it may be a little too dramatic to speak of 
"the end of the world." Human beings, as members of a hardy 
and cunning species, shall prevail; the human organism can 
cope. But man is more than an organism. He is a highly gre-
garious animal, and it is the social arrangements he has built 
up-which in fact defme his existence-that would be im-
periled by a severe modification of the environment. It is the 
end of the social world we speak of here, and that could be as 
deadly as a more tangible sort of disaster. 
Again, past experience is a poor guide in contemplating 
twentieth-century responses to permanent climatic change. In 
pre-historic times, whole peoples may have been able to 
migrate in search of a more hospitable environment. Our com-
plex social and political institutions make that alternative 
impossible today. Quite obviously, most of us are unlikely 
nomads; one cannot pick up and move a large metropolis. 
Just as important, even if we were mobile, there would be no 
place to go; aggressively guarded international boundaries 
prevent the peaceful movement of large numbers across the 
face of the earth. In fact, we know enough about the selfish 
side of our fellow Americans-the attempts of some com-
munities to limit further growth is a notable example-to 
realize that refugees would not be welcomed with open arms 
even in more temperate parts of the United States. 
If we view social institutions as artifacts designed to pro-
vide stability in the face of scarcity (i.e., valued things in any 
society can seldom be equally distributed), then it is plain to 
see that an intensification of scarcity through natural causes 
would have serious consequences. The easiest doomsday 
scenario can be drawn from the field of international rela-
tions. The major military powers derive their strength from 
their access to natural resources. It would not be surprising 
if these powers, including the United States, should begin to 
covet the bounty of weaker neighbors if climatic change were 
threatening their gross national product. That is, to ensure 
national survival, the more powerful states might be inclined 
to impose their will on other countries. At the same time, 
those states living on a small reserve of food might well be 
impelled to follow an expansionist course. One can trace many 
routes from the onset of long-range climatic change to the 
Third (and last) World War. The redefmition of the "haves" 
and the "have-nots" would undermine what little international 
stability we now have. 
Climatic change would also have the gravest impact on 
domestic politics. Even now, in what we consider to be "nor-
mal" conditions, there are clearly apparent defects in our 
political machinery. We have succeeded as a nation for two 
hundred years, but the strains in our system are now so no-
ticeable that the next hundred is problematic. Our natural 
resources have given us a comfortable cushion so that we have 
been able to practice a relatively peaceful style of politics. 
With or without climatic change, it is not fearmongering to 
suggest that the good old days are gone forever. 
It is already true that our society has become so com-
plex, so fragile, so interdependent, that we are vulnerable to 
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even very brief deviations from the normal climate. The point 
was graphically illustrated recently in New York City. A cen-
tury ago, a thunderstorm was only a passing nuisance; today, 
if we are to believe Consolidated Edison, it is enough to loosen 
the social fabric for millions of people and to disrupt com-
munications throughout the entire nation. On the other coast, 
a bit of folk wisdom has it that two hundred years ago when it 
rained, people got wet; today in Los Angeles, when it rains-
and brings traffic accidents, earthslides and flash floods-
people get dead. Simply put, we are so complicated that 
natural events are no longer regarded as natural; we defy them 
and are the inevitable losers in our attempts to fool Mother 
Nature. 
The issues posed by the distribution of natural resources, 
especially water, further illuminate the problem. Water re-
sources policy has been, to use the jargon of political science, 
"distributive." That is to say, water has been regarded as a 
nearly free good belonging to a single landowner or, at most, a 
very small geographic area; the idea that one can claim "This 
is my water" does not strike Americans as unusual despite 
the worldwide scope of the hydrologic cycle. However, in the 
exploitation or supplementation of this resource, smaillocali-
ties have demanded, and generally received, support from 
larger units of government. Water has been seen as something 
to which every American citizen has a god-given right, regard-
less of cost and of more economical uses. In the not too dis-
tant past, our apparently limitless supply of wealth and water 
convinced policy-makers that everyone could receive his pay-
offs. Government has seldom said "no" to anyone wanting 
water, for whatever purpose. We have been just as gloriously 
profligate in other areas, such as energy, which would also be 
affected by climatic change. 
We were given a cruel preview of what is in store during 
the winter of 1976-77. With extremely cold weather in the 
East and drought throughout the western states, many people 
could see that there simply was not enough slack in our 
economy to sustain everyone in the manner to which they 
had become accustomed. Yet the political system has not yet 
dealt with any of the hard choices implicit in the facts of the 
matter. Indeed, when President Carter made a bold move to 
re-examine a number of pending water projects, most of 
which are products of the traditional pork-barrel style of 
politics, he suffered a serious defeat. This was in spite of the 
fact that the completion of the projects, especially in the 
semi-arid West, will only encourage the further population of 
those areas most susceptible to future climatic shock. 
The crunch has already arrived, even if we do not face 
further scarcity induced by climatic change. There is not 
enough to go around, at least as we presently make allocative 
decisions. We delude ourselves if we think there is some easy 
technological fix; even if we put scientists in Boston to work 
on turning water into gas, and those in Berkeley on converting 
gas into water, our finite resources cannot be stretched far 
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enough. Attempts at providing public relief to those areas 
impacted by natural disaster have become, even in the short 
term, prohibitively expensive. For example, by July 31,1977 
drought relief efforts had cost taxpayers nearly one bil1io~ 
dollars; and the number of affected areas included 41 states 
and over two-thirds of all counties. The question naturally 
arises: When the whole country is declared a disaster area, 
who will pay the bill? 
Politicians have recently taken to orating about the 
coming "era of limits" and to issuing calls for the development 
of a less wasteful "life style." So far, these leaders have found 
it hard to practice what they preach. But we cannot heap the 
blame on the deficiencies of our statesmen. This is, after all, 
a democratic society, and one can make a good argument that 
public decision-makers are only giving the public the sort of 
government it wants and, for better or worse, what it deserves. 
The whole question gets back to the degree of congru-
ence between social reality, which we can control, and physi-
cal reality. To a certain extent, any human progress depends 
upon the ability of people to overcome their reality; the 
course of civilization is a triumph over those doctrinaires of 
one true faith or another who are always happy to assure us 
that any change is impossible. We in the Midwest should be 
especially grateful that the pioneers displayed a heroic con-
tempt for the facts of the situation and proceeded to develop 
what was then the Great American Desert. There must come a 
point, however, when the intractability of the physical world 
will overwhelm the most strenuous human efforts. For exam-
ple, those migrants to southern California from Iowa and 
lliinois who feel that there is some inalienable right to a lush 
bluegrass lawn and ornamental ponds in their backyards are 
trying to live in a world which simply does n')t exist. Southern 
California is a desert and we cannot afford the cosmetics 
needed to disguise that fact. 
Viable social institutions should be sensitive enough to 
adjust to changes in environmental reality. Unfortunately, 
that conclusion has often inspired technicians to assert that 
they should be society's eyes and ears-and hands with which 
to force people to do what is "right." But this is not a matter 
for social engineering and no easy institutional answers come 
to mind, beyond the most obvious, i.e., the imposition of a 
centralized allocation system which would have the power to 
beat each individual into conformance with some predeter-
mined plan of distribution. Such systems have existed often 
enough in mankind's history-Egypt, Persia, China, Peru-and 
all have ultimately collapsed. Moreover, to purchase sheer 
survival at the price of despotism would be repugnant to any-
one with a sense of human dignity. 
A democratic system requires that the scientists and 
other technicians remain "on tap and not on top." But even in 
that role, the experts can perform a valuable service. To begin 
with, we need much more basic research into the relationship 
between society and environment during periods of climatic 
stress. As we have just learned, there is no solid information 
about the impact of drought on social and political institu-
tions and each time this sort of event occurs we are unpre-
pared. In another area, scientists must continue to educate 
the public about the vagaries of climate. It would seem that 
we are a people obsessed with weather, and weather fore-
casting is both folk art and science. At the same time, we are 
climatological illiterates. Thus we brood about whether it 
will rain tomorrow on our picnic or parade, but we do not 
spend much time wondering if it will rain in ten years so that 
we can continue to eat. 
In good times and bad, a democratic system must still 
depend upon the shared perceptions of all its citizens. All 
members of the community must adjust to a new physical 
reality, as painful as that adjustment may be. And if the ad-
justment is to be healthy, it must be more than a debilitating 
sense of resignation. To persevere in spite of a changing cli-
mate, that is the challenge. The results of this symposium on 
climatic change, it is hoped, will be one contribution to the 
difficult business of reconciling the social and physical reali-
ties. 
To return to the original question, then, what will be 
the social and political implications of climatic change? The 
only reasonable answer is "it depends." The possible disloca-
tions are now beyond calculation. How we will respond to 
these dislocations is still another matter. An informed public 
may be able to respond to new and terrifying environmental 
problems without a fatal amount of divisiveness if-and this 
is a very big if-the public cooperates in the construction of 
a new social reality. 
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